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According to common sense, and much philosophy of  perception as well,
human vision is a unitary psychological activity, whose single purpose is
to yield a unified conscious picture of  the visible features of  the world.
Many automatic behaviours (e.g., the control of  human posture), how-
ever, depend on visual mechanisms, whose function is not to make an indi-
vidual visually aware of  the world. Furthermore, much empirical work in
the cognitive neuroscience of  vision in the last forty years has also cast
doubt on the assumption that the single purpose of  human vision is the
construction of  a unified picture of  the visible world by supporting the so-
called “two-visual-systems” model. According to this model, there exists
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in the visual cortex of  non-human and human primates an anatomical
bifurcation between two dissociable pathways: the ventral pathway and
the dorsal pathway. The former projects the primary visual areas onto the
infero-temporal lobe. The latter projects the primary visual areas onto the
parietal lobe (which further leads to the premotor and the motor cortex).
The two-visual-systems model is based on empirical evidence, including
single-cell recordings in the brains of  monkeys, the neuropsychological
examination of  human patients containing a lesion in their visual cortex,
and psychophysical experiments performed on healthy human adults. Of
course, the scientific question raised by this body of  empirical work is:
what is the functional significance of  this anatomical segregation? The
major aim of  
 
Ways of Seeing
 
 is to provide a framework that can both pro-
vide a satisfactory answer to the scientific question and elucidate some of
the ensuing philosophical issues: what is the meaning of  the English verb
“to see?” How does subjective visual experience yield objective knowledge
of  the world? How does conscious visual experience relate to thought?
What is the contribution of  phenomenally conscious visual experience to
visually guided actions? 
Primates in general, and humans in particular, are endowed with hands
whose thumbs are separated from other fingers, a feature which enables
them to dexterously manipulate objects. Thus, many human actions
directed towards objects are hand actions: for example, humans can grasp
the handle of  a hammer with full-power grip or the handle of  a teacup
with precision grip. Until recently, there were two major competing ver-
sions of  the two-visual-systems model of  the primate visual system.
First, Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982), who initially discovered the ana-
tomical segregation in the visual cortex of  non-human primates, thought
of  the ventral pathway in terms of  the 
 
What
 
-stream (specialized in object-
identification) and of  the dorsal pathway in terms of  the 
 
Where
 
-stream
(specializing in the spatial localization of  objects). A few years later,
mostly on the basis of  the examination of  the effects of  brain lesions on
the visual abilities of  human patients, Milner and Goodale (1995)
agreed that the ventral stream underlies object-identification (or vision-
for-perception); however, they argued that the dorsal stream is at the ser-
vice of  the visuomotor transformation (i.e., the visual guidance of  hand
actions directed towards objects). 
In 
 
Ways of Seeing
 
, we draw a basic functional distinction between two
kinds of  visual processing of  objects: semantic and pragmatic processing.
The former’s purpose is the visual identification and recognition of
objects; the latter’s purpose is the visual guidance of  actions towards
objects. In healthy human beings, the two kinds of  processing cooperate
harmoniously. But this harmony can be disrupted either by brain lesions
or by careful experimental design. We argue that, according to whether
the task is perceptual or visuomotor, some visual stimuli can be processed
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either semantically or pragmatically. We further argue that both the
semantic and the pragmatic processing of  objects can occur at various lev-
els. Visual-form apperceptive agnosic patients, who cannot process the
shape of visually presented objects, are impaired at a deeper level of  seman-
tic processing than are associative agnosic patients, who can represent the
shape of a visually perceived object, but cannot match their representation
of the shape of an object onto their concept (or onto the name) of  the
object stored in memory. Optic ataxic patients, who cannot accurately
reach and grasp objects, are more deeply impaired in the pragmatic pro-
cessing of the target of  a visually guided action than are apraxic patients,
whose visuomotor transformation is intact, but who cannot recognize the
function of a tool, use it, or understand others’ actions with tools. 
In a nutshell, we agree with Milner and Goodale that Ungerleider and
Mishkin’s model is wrongly predicated on the assumption that the single
function of  the primate visual system is to build a unified conscious pic-
ture of  the visible world. Against Ungerleider and Mishkin’s model, Mil-
ner and Goodale were right to make room for the visuomotor
transformation within the human visual cortex. However, we criticize Mil-
ner and Goodale’s model in three respects: first, on the basis of  the neu-
ropsychological examination of  neglect patients (with a lesion in their
right inferior parietal lobe), we argue that the inferior parietal lobe (which
is part of  the dorsal pathway) is involved in the perception of  spatial rela-
tions among perceived objects and that, therefore, Milner and Goodale
were wrong in hypothesizing that activity in the ventral stream alone is
both necessary and sufficient for the conscious visual perception of
objects. Second, we argue that, by restricting visually guided action to the
visuomotor transformation (i.e., to reaching, pointing towards, and
grasping a target), Milner and Goodale vastly underestimate the scope
and complexity of  the pragmatic processing of  visual inputs, which they
reduce to its lowest level (the visuomotor transformation), at the expense
of  higher levels (such as the use and recognition of  complex tools and the
perception and understanding of  actions involving the use of  tools).
Finally, we point out that human vision is not restricted to the perception
of objects that they can also manipulate. Humans can perceive many
things that they cannot manipulate, e.g., shadows, holes, gases, clouds,
events and actions. In particular, they can see human agents act. But, we
argue, seeing these things falls beyond the scope of  the two-visual-systems
hypothesis. 
In 
 
Ways of Seeing
 
, we endorse a broadly representationalist framework
for elucidating the nature and content of  both visual perception and visu-
ally guided actions. The semantic processing of  a visual object gives rise
to a visual percept. At the lowest level of  semantic processing, what
Dretske (1969) would call “non-epistemic” visual percepts, are visual rep-
resentations with non-conceptual content. At a higher level of  semantic
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processing, epistemic visual percepts make visual information about the
world available for conceptual thoughts (i.e., what philosophers call “the
belief  box”). The lowest level of  pragmatic processing gives rise to a visuo-
motor representation of  a target of  action. We argue that some psycho-
physical experiments on size-contrast illusory displays provide evidence
for the existence of  a dissociation, in healthy human adults, between per-
ceptual responses and visuomotor responses. We further argue that these
experiments show that the visuomotor system can be fooled and made to
misrepresent two-dimensional features of  the display as three-dimensional
properties. If  visuomotor representations (that arise from low-level prag-
matic processing) can misrepresent a visual display, it follows that they are
genuine mental representations—or so we argue. Roughly speaking, we
argue that a visuomotor representation of  an object is the representation
of what Gibson (1979) would call an affordance for action. The purpose
of  a visuomotor representation of  a target of  action is to provide visual
information for the benefit of  an agent’s motor intention. Whereas beliefs
have a mind-to-world direction of  fit, intentions and desires have a world-
to-mind direction of  fit. Percepts that arise from higher-level semantic
processing share the mind-to-world direction of  fit of  beliefs. We argue
that visuomotor representations, like Millikan’s (1996) “pushmi-pullyu”
representations, are hybrid mental representations: they represent facts in
a format suitable, not for forming beliefs (acquiring knowledge) about
them, but for informing an agent’s motor intention about how to act on
an object. 
One major task, then, of  
 
Ways of Seeing 
 
is to provide a principled dis-
tinction between the non-conceptual content of  non-epistemic visual per-
cepts and the non-conceptual content of  visuomotor representations.
Representing the colour of  an object may be a crucial condition for iden-
tifying it, but not for grasping it. We argue that the main difference
between the content of  a visuomotor representation of  an object and the
content of  a visual percept (at either a lower or higher level of  semantic
processing) of  the same object lies in the representation of  the object’s
spatial position. The job of  a visual percept is object-identification and
recognition: it must, therefore, convey visual information about objects to
the human long-term memory and reasoning systems. To fill its purpose,
it must encode information about the enduring properties of  objects that
are relevant for object-recognition over time. For an object to be identified
and recognized at different times, in different lighting conditions or from
different spatial perspectives, its enduring properties must be represented
in a format that is object-dependent and viewer-independent. The job of
a visuomotor representation is to track the visual features of  a target that
are of  immediate relevance for an agent’s grasping (or pointing towards)
it. An agent cannot reach and grasp (or point to) a target unless her visual
system computes its spatial location in an egocentric frame of  reference.
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Thus, for a visuomotor representation of  a target to fill its function, it
must represent the target’s spatial location relative to the agent’s egocen-
tric frame of  reference (i.e., centered on the agent’s body). 
Suppose now that you are faced with a basket of  fruits containing pears,
apricots, peaches, bananas, oranges, a melon, and a collection of  red, yel-
low, and green apples. Suppose that you want to eat a red apple. If  so, then
you must first be able to reach it. You will not be able to reach it unless you
represent its location in egocentric coordinates. If  you reach it, then you
will not be able to grasp it accurately unless you represent its shape, size,
and orientation. This is what a visuomotor representation of  the apple in
the basket is good for: representing the absolute shape, size, and orienta-
tion of  a target, whose location is represented in egocentric coordinates.
But you could not form a visuomotor representation of  your target in the
basket unless you had visually selected it from the set of  distractors. In
order to do so, you must represent the shape, size, texture, and colour of  a
particular red apple and compare it to the shapes, sizes, textures, and
colours of  potentially competing targets. This is what a visual percept is
good for. Now, you will not be able to form such a visual percept of  the
relative shape, size, texture, and colour of  the relevant red apple unless you
represent its location in some allocentric frame of  reference centered on
some item in the visual array. The fine-grained non-conceptual content of
the visual percept of  a selected red apple outstrips the conceptual content
of  a belief  about the very same red apple that it is of  a kind that makes
good cider. The non-conceptual content of  the percept is involved in the
selection of  the target of  an action of  prehension, but it does not guide the
fine-tuning of  the hand movement. On the basis of  a visual epistemic per-
cept of  the content of  the basket, what you might do is count the number
of apples and come to form beliefs about the relative sets of  different fruits
in the basket—perhaps that there are more pears than apples or that there
are more apricots than any other fruits there. 
 In-depth examination of  deeply apperceptive visual-form-agnosic
patient DF shows that, although she is unable to recognize the shape of
visually presented objects, she nonetheless is able to reach for and grasp
objects with close to normal precision grip. DF can form visuomotor rep-
resentations, but she fails to form visual percepts of  objects. She fails to
be phenomenally aware of  the size, shape, and orientation of  the objects
that she can grasp. Since she can grasp it, DF can represent the size, shape,
and orientation of  an object for the purpose of  reaching for and grasping
it, but not for recognizing it. She can do so only if  and when she represents
its spatial position in an egocentric frame of  reference, even if  not in an
allocentric frame of  reference. In 
 
Ways of Seeing
 
, we assume that a neces-
sary condition for perceptual (or phenomenal) awareness of  an object is
the ability to identify and recognize its visual features. We further assume
that, unless a creature has the resources to make contrastive identifica-
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tions among distinct instances of  one and the same visual feature, she will
not be able to recognize or identify it (the constraint of  contrastive iden-
tification). Now, in a visuomotor representation of  a target of  action, the
spatial position of  the target is represented in an egocentric frame of  ref-
erence centered on the agent’s body. In a visual percept, the spatial posi-
tion of  the object is represented in an allocentric frame of  reference. We
argue that unless an object’s spatial position is represented in some allo-
centric frame of  reference (enabling the representation of  spatial relations
among several objects) one cannot become phenomenally aware of  such
visual attributes of  an object as its size, shape, and orientation. Only if  the
spatial position of  an object is represented in an allocentric frame of  ref-
erence centered on some item in the visual array can the relative size,
shape, and orientation of  an object be available for comparison with the
relative sizes, shapes, and orientations of  neighbouring objects. 
In a nutshell, the general picture espoused in 
 
Ways of Seeing
 
 is the fol-
lowing. Because thoughts, which have conceptual content, are both sys-
tematic and productive, they can rise above the limitations of  perception
and represent entities that are not in space. Because they can represent the
spatial relations among objects in some allocentric frame of  reference,
visual percepts satisfy the constraint of  contrastive identification and they
can make one visually aware of objects in space by representing their rela-
tive visual features. Because they represent the spatial position of objects
in egocentric coordinates, visuomotor representations enable an agent to
act on a target. But by representing its absolute size, shape, and orientation,
visuomotor representations fail to satisfy the constraint of  contrastive
identification, and thus, as such, they fail to make the agent phenomenally
aware of  the target’s visual features. 
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